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Abstract 
The standard framework of the decision theory is subjected to partial revision in re­
gard to the usage of the notion of alternative. An approach to judging the rationality 
of decision-maker's behavior is suggested for various cases of incomplete observability 
and/or controllability of alternatives. The approach stems from the conventional ax­
iomatic treatment of rationality in the general choice theory and proceeds via modifying 
the description of alternative modes of behavior into a generalized model that requires 
no explicit consideration of alternatives. The criteria of rationality in the generalized 
decision model are proposed. For the conventional model in the choice theory, these 
criteria can be reduced to the well known criteria of the regularity (binariness) of choice 
functions. Game and economic examples are considered. 
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ALTERNATIVES 
Andrey V. Malishevski 
0. Introduction
This paper reconsiders the criteria for the rationality of decisions that were elaborated
in the works on the general choice theory by K.Arrow(1959,1963) ,  A.Sen(1970,1971) and 
their followers, and expands these criteria to some unconventional yet more realistic 
situations with vague alternatives. 
Those are the situations where the alternatives faced by the decision-maker (DM) are 
only partly controllable by DM and/or only partly observable by the investigator-analyst 
who tries to judge the rationality of DM's behavior. (We will consider different versions 
of DM below, such as game players or consumers). The extreme case of vagueness of 
alternatives for the analyst is a situation when neither the alternative modes of behavior 
themselves nor the implemented mode are accessible to an outside observation. In such a 
case the analyst may judge the rationality of the behavior only by juxtaposing, on the one 
hand, the potential abilities and opportunities of DM in various situations of the decision 
making, and on the other hand, the results achieved. The development and analysis of 
a generalized model for such a case is presented in the main part of this paper. The 
first, preliminary part is devoted to the discussion and illustrative analysis of a number 
of examples and particular problems. 
The conventional approach to judging the rationality of decisions that are more gen­
eral than simple pairwise comparisons of given alternatives, represents the following. It 
is usually assumed that, after seeing all alternative modes of behavior, one judges the 
rationality of the implemented mode of behavior based on the observation of the mode 
selected among all possible modes. That is, that the analyst who observes the behavior 
of or/and sets unreal or Gedanken experiments with DM has to ' . -
(i) know the decision made eventually by DM; 
(ii) see (mentally) the whole "space" of alternative modes of behavior; 
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(iii) see the "boundaries" of the set of admissible alternatives in this space for each 
specific choice act; 
(iv) possess some basic principles for judging the rationality of the observed behavior 
based on the above data (plus perhaps something else) . 
Usually the items (i),(ii),(iii) are not being discussed (Schwartz (1986) is one excep­
tion) - they are included into the statement of the problem, and the analyst's attention is 
focused then on the item (iv). Concerning the latter, there are two opposite ways ofrea­
soning: (A) direct, or external, and (B) indirect, or internal. In the type "A" reasoning, 
an a priori criterion for the appreciation and/ or comparison of alternatives is  assumed; 
this may be, e.g. , an "objective" value (worth, utility etc.) of each alternative. Then, the 
basis for judging the rationality of the behavior is whether the alternative chosen by DM 
is the best one according to this criterion. In the type "B" reasoning, the investigator has 
no a priori criterion for judging the values, mutual advantages etc. of the alternatives. In 
such a case, the only way to judge the rationality of the behavior is to watch the results 
of the decisions made in different situations, to juxtapose and compare them, and to look 
whether they are in accordance with our own notion of a logically consistent behavior. 
This approach has led to the general (abstract) choice theory, in which the postulates of 
rational behavior are introduced in an axiomatic form. Such an abstract analysis of the 
choice rationality naturally produces constructive ways of revealing "subjective" values 
or advantages of alternatives; it is the subject of the theory of revealing preferences that 
will be discussed below in detail. 
To show the essence of an approach based on indirect, external judgements about 
the rationality, let us consider the simplest kind of decision making - the choice based 
on a pairwise comparison of alternatives. It is usually accepted that by choosing the 
alternative a from the pair {a, b},  the alternative b from the pair { b, c} and the alternative 
c from the pair {a,  c } ,  the decision-maker simply manifests irrationality and the lack 
of logic of his/her behavior. Indeed, such a violation of the transitivity of the revealed 
preferences contradicts the hypothesis that DM does indeed maximize some value (utility) 
of alternatives, a scalar function v (x) (x = a, b, c) . Thus, we conclude that DM is 
irrational in the narrow sense. At the same time the observed behavior is consistent 
with the hypothesis that DM follows the maximization according to a binary preference 
relation "x is better than y" (which in this case constitutes the cycle "a is better than b, b
is better than c, c is  better than a"). Note that the latter cycle implies the impossibility 
of a (nonempty) rational choice between the three alternatives a, b, c i.e. , the necessity of 
refusal from the choice. By admitting an empty choice as an equally eligible choice, we 
shall treat the very possibility of representation of choice via the optimization according 
to a binary relation as the rationality in the broad sense. The exact criteria of rationality 
for this case based on the external observation of the choice will be given below. 
Furthermore, if the subject chooses the alternative a from the pair {a ,  b} but b from 
the triple {a ,  b, c } ,  this manifests an irrationality that is conventionally referred to as a 
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violation of the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Such a violation 
implies impossibility to explain the choice via the optimization over some preference. 
Indeed, according to the first experiment, a is better than b but the opposite should be 
true in the second experiment; so we obtain the external irrationality in the broad sense. 
The above reasoning concerns item (iv) of the list above, the basis for j udging the 
rationality of a behavior. Here we have adopted the conventional concept of the choice 
rationality (Arrow, 1959, 1963; Sen, 1970,1971) .both in. the narrow sense, as optimization 
of a utility function, and in the broad sense, as optimization over a binary preference 
relation. This concept has been critically analyzed in a number of works (see, e.g., Fish- ' 
burn, 1970; Schwartz, 1972; Plott, 1973; Aizerman and Malishevski, 1981; and the survey 
by Aizerman, 1985). It was shown that for various widely spread modes of choice some 
of the axioms introduced by Arrow, Sen and their successors (different combinations of 
those produce criteria with a different degrees of rationality) cannot be satisfied together: 
some may actually fail. The idea of satisfying one axiom at a time has led to the non­
conventional quasirational mechanisms of choice. Such mechanisms focus on the choice 
of alternatives undominated according to some extended dominance relations; the latter 
are more complex than usual binary relations on the fixed alternative space . We shall 
touch upon this nonconventional theory below. In this paper we make the next step and 
concentrate on the criticism of the items (i), (ii) , (iii) of the analyst 's list; for the sake 
of simplicity, we take as a basis the classical criteria and the conventional concept of the 
choice rationality. 
These issues are discussed in Section 1 below. The remaining, constructive part of the 
paper deals with formal models and their analysis, and is arranged as follows. In Section 
2, the conventional model of the general choice theory is reviewed and a summary of 
rationality conditions is given in a convenient form. The main of those is the axiom of 
revealed preferences or, in another aspect, the axiom of independence of irrelevant alter­
natives. Section 3 presents three examples in which the rationality criteria are applied 
to situations with vague alternatives. In Section 4 a new model of decisions with hidden 
alternatives is proposed, and corresponding rationality axioms are introduced. Analysis 
of this model reveals the inner structure of rationality. The conclusive Section 5 presents 
a sketch of further possible generalizations. 
L Informal discussion of the problem 
We shall depart, step by step, from conventional statements and from the standard 
concept. Recall that we have already abandoned the item (iv) of the analyst's list (opti­
mization approach based on value functions or preference relations) ,  but we have still kept 
the preceding items (i), (ii ) ,  (iii). Now we shall gradually abandon the item (iii) (observ­
ability of the admissible alternative set) ,  then (ii) (observability of the total alternative 
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space), and finally (i) (observability of the alternative(s) chosen). 
We start with item (iii ) ,  the notion of admissible (or feasible) alternative sets. Ap­
parently, the principal source of this notion and of the choice theory itself has been the 
theory of consumption. The prototype of the abstract admissible set in that theory was 
the notion of the budget set as a subset in the space of commodity bundles considered 
as the totality of all conceivable alternatives for a consumer. Now we shall use this 
particular case to demonstrate an ambiguity of the seemingly�dear.notion of admissible 
sets. The budget set is the set of all commodity bundles whose cost does not exceed 
the value of the consumer's budget (income); we shall go to the formal notations a little 
later. The very idea that all those and only those commodity bundles that belong to the 
budget set are available to the consumer seems to be justified when one speaks about a 
long-run term, say ten years .  But for a short-run term, say a month, the boundaries of 
the admissible set become hazy. Indeed, the consumer may exceed his budget, e.g. ,  using 
a seller's credit or a bank loan; in such a case the virtual admissible set turns out to be 
wider than the primary budget set. As another possibility, the consumer may judge as 
inadmissible even those commodity bundles which cost less but not too much less than 
his income. In such a case the virtual subjective admissible set becomes narrower than 
the initial budget set. 
In both cases the resulting behavior, deemed rational by the consumer, may look 
irrational to the external observer. To demonstrate this, let us start with a "polite 
guest" story which seem to have been described first by Corbin and Marley, 1 974. The 
following quote is from the review lecture by Sen, 1992: 
"Suppose the person is choosing between slices of cakes offered to him" and "he is trying to choose 
as large a slice as possible1 subject to not picking the very largest, because he does not want to be 
taken as greedy, or because he would like to follow a social �onvention or a principle learned at his
mother's knees: "never pick the largest slice".( ... ) If the three slices in decreased order were z,y,x, 
then he is behaving exactly correctly according to that principle" [when choosing x from {x, y} and
y from {x,y, z} which violates the IIA axiom].
In this example the best choice is not the choice of the best. That is, the virtual admis­
sible alternative set for the person, i.e., the set of alternatives allowed both "physically" 
and "psychologically" becomes a different, narrower set than an externally observable set 
of feasible alternatives. 
Returning to the example of the choice under bounded budget, it is clear that qual­
itatively the behavior of the consumer who saves money, and thus makes the subjective 
admissible set narrower than the budget set, will be similar to that in the above Sen's ex­
ample. More formally, present the standard model of consumer's behavior as the solution 
of t.he ut.ilit.y maximization problem 
maxu(x1 , . . .  , xn)  (1 )  
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L Pi Xi ::; I, Xi 2': 0, i = 1 ,  ... , n,
where Xi and Pi are the quantity and the price of i-th good, respectively, and I is the 
consumer's income. (Another, nonconventional model will be considered in an axiomatic 
form in Section 3). Here the standard admissible set for the consumer is his budget set 
Be Rn: 
B(p1 , ... ,pn;I) = {x;;; 0 I LPiXi ::; I}.
The modified behavior of the consumer-saver can be described by the model 
max v( X1, . . .  , Xni s) 
LPiXi + s::; I, xi 2': 0, i = 1,. .. ,n;s 2': 0, 
where s is the level of consumer's savings. 
Consider a special case of the modified utility function v: 
v(x,s)= {�� if s 2': a, 
ifs < a, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
where a = const > 0 - the least subjectively admissible level of savings (assurance level). 
This describes the case where the consumer maximizes his genuine utility function under 
the budget constraint, with the additional requirement that the level of savings be not 
less than the admissible threshold. In such a case, if we replace I by I' = I - a, the 
problem (3) becomes equ-ivalent to the problem (1 ) ,  and we find ourselves in the position 
of the Sen's cake-chooser, with seemingly irrational external behavior, from the external 
observer standpoint. Namely, the optimal solution (x*; s) = (xt, . . .  , x�, s) of the problem 
(3) has as its x-th component the optimal solution x* =(xi, . . . , x�) of the problem ( 1 )  
with I replaced by I' = I - a, and (under the natural condition of monotonic increasing 
of u in xis) L, Pi Xi = I'. Then, accepting the new budget constraint I' instead of I in 
the modified problem (3) will definitely lead to the consumer's changing his decision x*, 
in spite of its seeming admissibility even in the new budget set B(p, I'). 
Moreover, a similar result will appear in a "smooth" case when v depends on s 
continuously but increases in s sharply enough when s is small. Then the s-component 
s* of the optimal solution of (3) will become positive, and the qualitative picture will 
obviously remain the same. In the framework of the standard model ( 1  ) ,  from the 
external observer's point of view the consumer choice of .the commodity bundle x* will 
look irrational. Note that in the smooth case it is more difficult to interpret the situation 
just as narrowing of the admissible alternative set. Indeed, formally we can still reduce 
the problem (3) to ( 1 ) ,  by replacing I in ( 1 )  by I'= I-s* and taking u(x) = v(x; s*). But 
the parameter s* here will be known only a posteriori. Since the consumer chooses the 
quantities x = (x1, . . .  , Xn) ands simultaneously, it is hardly right to say that he selects 
the best among alternatives x E B(p, I - s*). Rather, one could say that the consumer 
considers as alternatives other objects ,  namely the composite bundles ( x1, • • .  , xn; s ) .  
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Then the constraint in (3) yields the admissible set of the bundles; with such treatment 
of the alternative space and the feasible set in it, the behavior of the consumer starts 
looking rational. 
Note that by now we have encroached upon the very nature of the space of alternatives 
, i.e., not only upon item (iii) but also item (ii) of the analyst's list. Indeed, the lack of 
clarity, on the decision-maker's part, of what the real alternatives are is rather typical. 
This problem is especially acute when the possible outcomes of one's behavior, viz., the 
resulting states (or trajectories), depend not only on one's decisions, but on other external 
influences as well. 
In game-theoretical terms we can speak about dependencies of the results upon other 
players, or in particular upon the nature (which reflects factors beyond the person's con­
trol). One can see the important manifestation of this problem in the difference between 
actions of a player and outcomes of the play. The main interest of the player is  in the 
play outcome value; but, since he has to make choices between actions (modes of be­
havior) rather than directly between feasible outcomes, he is forced to also assign some 
subjective values to the actions themselves. Such "imputed values" of actions, to use 
the economic-theoretical term, can become tied to the outcome values in a rather so­
phisticated manner, due to the incomplete observability/controllability of factors and/or 
outcomes; this can also lead to a seeming irrationality of the player's actions. "In general, 
it is  hard to specify precisely the strategy sets available to the players" (Luce and Raiffa, 
1957, § 1 .4). A thorough discussion of some paradoxes in the decision logic, arising due to 
an insufficiently clear distinction between actions and outcomes, is held in Maher, 1987. 
Here we shall confine ourselves to two game-theoretic examples. 
Game example 1. Consider an antagonistic game with the payoff matrix llvdl of
the form 
(5) 
where Vi) is the reward of the player 1 after the move (action) i E I by player 1 and 
move j E J by player 2; I and J are the sets of possible actions of the players 1 and 2 
respectively; here I =  { 1, 2, 3} ,  J = {l, 2}.  Let player 2 make his choice first, and player 
1 - second, after learning the choice of player 1 .  Then the pair ( i*, j*) of optimal moves of 
both players forms the Stackelberg equilibrium, with player 2 being the leader and player 
1 the follower. In the equilibrium, the components i* and j* yield the inner max in i and 
the outer min in j in the expression 
min max Vij· jEJ iEJ (6) 
It is easy to see that for the payoff matrix llv;1H of the form (5) j* = 1 and i* = 1 .  If one
changes the matrix (5) by deleting its third line, one obtains new optimal actions j•' = 2
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and i*' = 2. Thus, if one observes only the behavior of player 1, one will see that in the
case of possible alternative actions { 1 ,  2, 3} player 1 will choose the action 1 ,  whereas in 
the case of the set { l ,  2} he will choose action 2. This runs counter to the IIA axiom. 
Game example 2. Consider the following payoff matrix for the game of DM with 
nature: 
{7) 
Let DM (in the role of player 1) use the criterion of the minimax regret (risk) after 
Savage (see, e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1957). Following this criterion, we first take the initial 
payoff matrix llvdl and convert it into the regret matrix llwijll, i E I, j E J, using the
formula 
Wij = max Vtj - VijlEI 
The player chooses such an action i* which yields 
min max w·· 
iEJ jEJ ZJ 
For the matrix llviJll of the form (7) the corresponding regret matrix llwdl is 
[� �] 
(8) 
(9) 
( 10) 
The optimal action of DM (player 1) will be i* = 1. Now, delete DM's action 3 from the 
admissible set. Then the new payoff matrix is obtained by deleting the last line from (7); 
the corresponding regret matrix llw'.jll becomes 
[ � � l ( 1 1 )  
(rather than the corresponding submatrix of ( 10)). So the new optimal action by DM is 
i*' = 2, again contrary to the IIA axiom. The above is a modification of the argument 
by Chernoff, 1954 (see also Luce and Raiffa, 1957, § 13.2); it will be used again in the 
sequel. 
Thus, there are two points of view on the notion of alternatives: (a) alternatives 
are externally observable actions of the player, and (b) alternatives are consequences 
of the actions, as perceived by the player. In (b ) , the values of alternatives are the 
player's subjective estimates e(i) of predicted consequences of his actions i E J. As 
the above examples of two games demonstrate, DM's behavior can be rational from his 
subjective standpoint but irrational from the external standpoint. In Example 1 ,  e(i) = 
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Vij• where j* = argmin;EJ u; with u; = max1EI v 1;; in Example 2, e(i) = -max;EJ Wij = 
min;o ( Vij - u;). It is easy to see that the "technical" reason of the observed irrationality
is the dependence of the estimate e( i) not only on the action i but also on the set of all 
admissible actions I ;  so a more correct notation fore should be e(i ;  I) .  We call the scalar 
value function of such form a pseudoscale of estimates, as distinct from a genuine scale, 
in accordance with which the estimate e of the alternative i must depend only on i. 
The seemingly irrational behavior in .the situation above can.be explained as follows. 
The observer presupposes that the decision-maker compares the actual values of the ob­
served alternatives independent of the context of comparison, while such a dependence 
can actually exist. In the game examples above it was the admissible alternative set I 
itself that played the role of the comparison context for alternative actions i ,  i', . . . . In 
more general cases the role of the comparison context for alternatives x,  y, . . .  may be 
given not (or not only) to the admissible alternative set X but to some other experiment 
conditions E ,  and so the value of the alternative x may have the generalized form of 
a pseudoscale v = v (x; E) .  As an example of such a representation, replace the sim­
plest consumer problem ( 1 )  by the equivalent problem without constraints, using the 
Lagrange-Kuhn-Tucker multiplier ,\: 
max (u(x1, . . . , xn) - ,\ LPiXi)·x1 , ... ,xn?:O ( 12) 
Then, the nonnegative orthant R'j. becomes the admissible alternative set, independent 
of the variables p1 , ... ,pn, I .  But at the same time the modified value function becomes 
parametrically dependent on p, I, and so it is a pseudoscale. 
Furthermore, it is easy to "explain" an arbitrary behavior of DM in the framework of 
the broad rationality, i.e. in terms of preference relations, if one accepts that a preference 
relation xRy ("x is preferred to y") depends on experiment conditions E (in particular, 
on the admissible alternative set X). Then R will be a pseudo relation rather than a 
proper binary relation on the alternative space (more precisely a pseudorelation of the 
form xR(E)y is a ternary relation between x, y and E) .  The approach to rationality in 
terms of pseudoscales or pseudorelations, i.e., in terms of alternative absolute or relative 
values depending on experimental conditions, can lead to nontrivial results. This will 
be so if one does not allow the absolute arbitrariness in this dependency and confines 
himself to some natural types of such dependencies. This results in "quasirational" modes 
of behavior, to be discussed in Section 2. 
The examples above illustrate ambiguity of the notion "alternative" . This leads 
us to extend or even completely change the alternative space. In conclusion, we shall 
demonstrate the possibility and necessity of such changes in the framework of the highly 
formalized standard model in the abstract choice theory. In the model, a set U of objects 
x, y, . . .  called alternatives is given; in every act of choice, some set X � U is presented and 
interpreted as an admissible alternative set. The act of choice amounts to the selection of 
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one of the alternatives x* among all x EX. A fundamental notion of the choice theory is 
the choice function c that puts into correspondence to a given X the alternative chosen 
from X : x* = c(X). Also considered in the general choice theory is the extended concept 
of choice function, a set-to-set mapping C, which puts into correspondence to the set X 
some of its subsets, X* c; X; so we have X* = C(X). The subset X,  called the choice 
set, is usually treated as the set of the chosen or, more precisely, eligible to be chosen, 
alternatives. In the case of a (conventionally) rational choice, the set C(X) consists of all 
those and only those alternatives which are better (or not worse) than each alternative 
in X. The case of single choice c(X) we began with, is formally reduced to a special case 
when C(X) is a singleton {c(X)}. Generally the set C(X) can contain more than one 
element, I C(X) I > 1 :  call it hyperchoice; or it may contain no elements at all, C(X) = 0: 
call it hypochoice. The latter is often considered as the sign of irrationality of the choice 
- a view which we will not share. 
In the general case of set-valued choice, including both hyperchoice and hypochoice, 
the very term "alternative" as applied to the primary objects x, y,  ... E U stops to be
justifiable, since its original meaning implies both mutually exclusive and mutually com­
plementary opportunities. Indeed, with the hypochoice the new unforeseen possibility is 
realized, viz., the empty choice. In different interpretations this may mean either refusal 
from a real choice or the return to the status quo situation which was not present be­
fore in the set of considered alternatives. We thus might formally include the additional 
alternative into the admissible set; the newly added alternative denotes the aforemen­
tioned state "refusal from choice" or "status quo" . To comment upon the situation, let 
us cite S.J.Lec: "To venture on the indecision, one has to be a man of decision". As 
for the primary alternatives, in the case of the hypochoice they do not exhaust all the 
opportunities for choice and so are not mutually complementary. 
On the other hand, in the case of the hyperchoice,. alternatives are not mutually 
exclusive: formally it looks as if all objects forming the choice set C(X) are chosen 
simultaneously, and sometimes all the options from C(X) can be actually realized si­
multaneously. One example may be the choice of dishes from the dinner menu X, when 
C(X) is the chosen set of dishes. In cases like this it is reasonable to treat as alternatives 
faced by the decision-maker the sets of objects taken as a whole rather than primary 
objects themselves. From the formal standpoint this implies that it is not the initial 
object set U, but the set of its subsets 2u which plays the role of the alternative space.
Thus, even on the abstract level of the formal model cif the choice an ambiguity may 
arise in what are the alternatives. This leads to a necessity of modifying not only the 
notion of admissible sets but the alternative space as well. An informal discussion of 
such modifications is given in Schwartz, 1986 (§1 .2). A formal analysis of both such 
cases above, hypochoice and hyperchoice, will be done in Section 3. 
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2. The conventional model of abstract decision making in the choice theory
and the rationality criteria 
Following the conventions of the choice theory, take the set U of all conceivable objects 
of choice (for the reasons mentioned above, we abandon the term "alternative" from the 
very beginning) .  The set U may be arbitrary (for simplicity one may consider a finite 
set). In the act of choice some admissible set of objects X <;; U is presented to DM for 
the choice. Denote by U the family of all nonempty sets X that may be presented for the 
choice and call it the family of presentations. In general, U may be an arbitrary subset 
of the set 2u\ {0} ;  we shall consider below some special types of families U. To each 
presentation X E U an object x* E X or a subset X* <;; X are put in correspondence; 
either of these is called choice from X and is denoted c(X) or C(X), respectively. In the 
first case we use the term single choice, in the second case set-wise choice. The functions 
c : U --+ U and C : U --+ 2u are called choice functions, single and set-wise respectively. 
Definition 1 We shall say that the choice function c (or C, respectively) is rational in 
the narrow sense, if there exist a linearly ordered set L and a mapping v : U --+ L such 
that for every X E U 
c(X) = argi_;iE3_;f v(X) (13) 
or, respectively, 
C(X) = Arg max v(X).xEX ( 14) 
Note that the latter, more general definition (14) may be rewritten as 
C(X) = {x EX I Vy E X :  v (x) 2". v(y)} .  ( 15) 
Definition 2 We shall say that the choice function c (or C, respectively) is rational in 
the broad sense, or rational for brevity, if there exists a binary relation R on U such that 
c(x) is the unique greatest element x* in X by R, i.e., 
c(X) = x* such that Vy EX : x* Ry ( 16) 
or, respectively, C(X) is the set of all the greatest elements in X by R, i.e. 
(17) 
Remark 1 In the definitions above, function v(x) has the meaning of a value of the 
object x from DM's point of view, and xRy is a (nonstrict) preference relation: x is "as 
good as" or "not worse than" y.  The representability of choice functions by means of 
their rationalization in the form ( 16) or ( 17) via some preference relation is sometimes 
called regularity, or binariness of choice functions. 
1 0  
Remark 2 For single choice functions c in Defs 1 and 2 to be well defined i t  is needed 
that the maximal element in (13) and the greatest element in (16) are unique; this 
uniqueness is the presupposition for these definitions. 
Remark 3 By taking the logical negation in Def 2, one can rewrite the definitions (16) 
and (17) in the equivalent forms 
and, respectively, 
c(X) = x* such that 3y E X : yPx 
C(X) = {x EX i 3y EX : yPx}, 
(18) 
(19) 
where P = R,-1 is conversely complementary to R (i.e., xPy iff not yRx), which is
usually interpreted as a strict preference relation "better than". Sometimes, when R is 
interpreted more as "as good as" than "not worse than" , another definition of P via R 
is used: P = R&R-1 (i.e., P is the asymmetrical part of R). These two expressions for
P via R coincide iff R,-1 ==* R, i.e. iff R is a complete relation (for all x, y E U either
xRy or yRx), which is equivalent to P = R,-1 being an asymmetric relation (i.e., for all
x, y E U both xPy and yPx must not hold together). Incompleteness of R in (16) or (17)
corresponds to the lack of asymmetry of P in (18) or (19) ,  respectively. The case when 
both xPy and yPx hold at the same time contradicts to usual interpretation of P as a 
strict preference and demands a more broad treatment as a rather abstract dominance 
relation. Formally we may admit even the lack of irreflexivity for a dominance relation P, 
i.e., an autodominance xPx for some x. The reasons for this will be discussed in Section
3. 
Remark 4 It is evident that a choice function rational in the narrow sense must be 
rational in the broad sense. Indeed, the narrow rationality (15) is the particular case 
of the broad rationality when the corresponding R is a (nonstrict) weak order, i.e., a
complete transitive relation. Namely, in such a case, given R in Def 2, one can take as 
L in Def 1 the set of equivalence classes of elements of U in the weak order R, this set 
being linearly ordered by the corresponding factor-relation for R. Conversely, given v in 
Def 1, take R in Def 2 as xRy ¢=? v(x);::: v(y). The issue of the type of a scale v, and 
in particular of numerical representability of preferences is a very important problem in 
the decision theory, but it is beyond the limits of this paper. 
Remark 5 The notions of the narrow and broad rationality in the case of single choice 
functions are more close to each other than one might expect based on their definitions. 
Namely, if a presentation family U is complete, i.e., it contains all nonempty subsets of 
U, then a single choice function con U is rational (in the broad sense) if and only if it
is rational in the narrow sense. Indeed, the only type of binary relations R which can 
1 1  
generate a single-value choice by the optimizational rule (16) on all nonempty X <;:: U is a 
nonstrict strong, or linear, order, i.e., an antisymmetric ( xRy&yRx ===? x = y) complete
transitive relation. This is easy to verify by considering the choice on pairs { x, y} and 
triples {x, y, z }. Moreover, the same is still true for the case of a "3-complete" family U 
containing all pairs and triples of objects. This is the reason for many simplifications in 
the case of single choice functions and "sufficiently complete" presentation families. It is 
also the reason why the general choice theory studies mainly set-wise choice functions: 
they enrich the theory by allowing, in particular, divergence between narrow and, broad 
rationality, with many intermediate "degrees of rationality" , at the expense of both 
technical difficulties and less clarity in using the notion "alternative" . In this paper, 
a different way to enrich reasoning is used - that of considering essentially incomplete 
presentation families. As will become clear later, this approach is very important for 
applications. 
Definition 3 We shall call a representation family U <;:: 2u: complete, if U = 2u\{0};
U-complete, if U is closed under unions, i.e., when {X"}vEN <;:: U then UvEN X" E U; 
pairwise-n-complete, if U is closed under nonempty pairwise intersections, i .e., when 
X, X' E U and X n X' # 0 then X n X' E U; finitely complete or k-complete, if every 
finite set, or respectively every set with the cardinality no more than k ,  belongs to U. 
Finally, we shall call U irreducible, if each X E U is irreducible under U-operation in 
the semilattice sense, i .e., if in every covering { Xv}vEN of X there exists X"* such that
X <;::X"*. 
In the choice-theoretical literature, mainly complete or at least finitely complete rep­
resentation families are dealt with; besides, we shall make use of other types including 
arbitrary families U. 
Now we shall formulate some properties that are typically expected from a rational 
choice. These have been developed in a long line of works from the pioneering papers 
of Samuelson (in the context of consumer choice), Chernoff (statistical decisions), Nash 
(a bargaining model), via formalization in terms of abstract choice functions by Uzawa, 
Arrow, and Sen et al., up to various recent extensions and generalizations. We shall 
list only those properties that are necessary for the present paper. They will be mainly 
properties of single choice functions c (following their real historical origin) which are 
more transparent 'than their generalized forms for set-wise choice functions C. 
We shall start with two properties that are both historically and conceptually the pri­
mary ones: the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences, WARP, introduced by Samuelson, 
1938, 1950, and the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, IIA, which, in the 
version used here, originates in Nash, 1950, Chernoff, 1954, and Radner and Marschak, 
1954 (the latter refer to the K.J.Arrow's idea) (see also Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Arrow, 
12 
1959; Sen, 1969). This axiom is often called Chernoff's axiom or a-axiom by Sen's clas­
sification. In view of an ambiguity in the treatment of IIA (see, e.g., comments in Luce, 
1959, and also Ray, 1973; Hansson, 1973; Kami and Schmeidler, 1976) we shall give this 
axiom a neutral name heredity,_ H (which reflects one important feature of it). Thus, 
start with conditions on single choice functions. 
Definition 4 We shall say that a single choice function c on a presentation family U 
satisfies the heredity property, H (or IIA axiom, in traditional terms, or Postulate 4 in 
Chernoff, 1954, or axiom a in Sen, 1969), if for every X, X' EU such that 
holds 
vi C X .A - , 
x = c(X), x EX'===? x = c(X'). 
(20) 
(21) 
The meaning of the definition is that an object that is the best in a large set is even 
more so the best in a smaller set; hence the property "to be the best" is hereditary. We 
will exploit this idea in a generalized form in the sequel. 
A different but closely related property (as we shall see later) is formulated as follows 
(Samuelson, 1938, 1950; Houthakker, 1950). 
Definition 5 We shall say that a single choice function c satisfies the weak axiom of 
revealed preference, WARP, if for every X, X' E U holds 
x = c(X), x' = c(X'), x EX', x' EX===? x = x'. (22) 
To interpret WARP and explain the term "revealed preference," transform (22) into 
the following equivalent form. Let us treat the case x = c( X), y E X, as the binary 
relation "x is (revealingly) preferable to y"; denote it xRcY· Then (22) means that 
xRcx'&x' Rex ===? x = x'. At the same time, if one considers the case x = c(X) ,  y E 
X, y =J x, as the binary relation "x is (revealingly) strictly preferable to y" and denotes 
it xPcy, then (22) is equivalent to the impossibility of a cycle of the form xPcx'&x' Pcx. 
--1 And one more equivalent formulation for WARP has the form Pc =} Re .
Remark 6 Note that, in general, revealed nonstrict and strict preference relations Re 
and Pc may satisfy neither the equality Pc = !!:;;1 nor the equality Pc = Rc&ft;;1 in 
Remark 3; one can guarantee only the implications Rc&f!:;;1 ===? Pc ===? Re. But since
WARP means Pc ===? R:;;1, the previous chain of implications yields Pc = Rc&fl:;;1. 
Moreover, the latter equality turns out to be still another equivalent formulation of 
WARP. 
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Definition 6 (Houthakker, 1950; see also llichter, 1966, 1971;  Hansson, 1 968; Suzu­
mura, 1977, et al.) We shall say that a single choice function c satisfies the strong axiom 
of revealed preferences, SARP, if for every X1 , . . .  , xn E U, n > 1 ,  
i _ (Xi) i E xi+1 · _ l � 1 _ _ nX -C ,X ,i- , . . .  ,n -----T X - . . .  -X 
(where xn+I = X' ) .  
(23) 
WARP is the particular case of SARP with n = 2. The equivalent reformulation of 
SARP in terms of the strict preference Pc is: there exist no x', .. . , xn E U, n > 1 ,  such 
that x1 Pcx2 , • • •  , xn P,x1 (a cycle of revealed strict preferences) .  
The axioms of revealed preferences are oriented toward the rationality in the narrow 
sense (see below). Now we shall introduce additional axioms oriented toward the broad 
rationality. The first is 1-axiom due to Sen's classification (Sen, 1971;  see also Chernoff, 
1954, Postulate 10) ;  keeping in mind its further extension to more general models, we 
give it a neutral term "concordance". 
Definition 7 We shall say that a single choice function c satisfies the concordance con­
dition C, if for every set X EU and for every its decomposition in U, viz . ,  a set family 
{X"}vEN <;;; U (where the index set N is arbitrary, perhaps infinite) such that 
holds 
X = U X", 
vEN 
(\/11 EN: x = c(X")) ===? x = c(X). 
(24) 
(25) 
A generalized formulation which combines concordance (!-axiom) with the heredity 
(a-axiom) was given in Mir kin, 197 4: 
Definition 8 We shall say that a single choice function c satisfies the concordant heredity 
condition, CH, if for every set X E U and for every its covering in U, viz . ,  a set family 
{X"}vEN <;;; U such that 
holds 
X c u X" 
- vEN ' 
(\/11 EN : x = c(X"))&(x EX)===? x = c(X). 
The last axiom of this series is taken from Richter, 1966, 1971.  
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(26) 
(27) 
Definition 9 We shall say that a single choice function c satisfies the Richter's Axiom,
RA, if for every X E U 
(Vy EX: xRcy) ===> x = c(X). (28) 
Remark 7 It is easy to see that owing to the definition of Re the converse implication 
in (28) is always true, and so the Richter's axiom may be presented in the following 
equivalent form: 
x = c(X) {=}(Vy EX: xR,y). (29) 
Now we shall write a number of statements concerning interrelations between the 
above axioms under various assumptions on the presentation family U, using auxiliary Def 
3. Some of these statements are apparently known (although at times I am unable to give
the primary references) or can be easily obtained from the very definitions. Nevertheless, 
for the sake of completeness, I will give a summary of statements and my own system of 
shortened proofs. We start with the correspondence between two fundamental conditions, 
IIA (i.e., H) and WARP. 
Proposition 1 For an arbitrary U, WARP implies IIA. Conversely, when U is pairwise­
n-complete, then IIA implies WARP. 
Indeed, let WARP be fulfilled. Then, with the condition (20) in IIA, let us apply 
the formulation of WARP; the result will yield (21), as required. Conversely, let IIA be 
true and U be pairwise-n-complete. Take X, X' E U that satisfy the premise in (22) and 
consider X" = X n X' which belongs to U by assumption. Then, owing to IIA as applied 
to the pair X, X", we have c(X") = x, and owing to IIA as applied to X', X", we have 
c(X") = x'; hence x = x', which satisfies the conclusion i.n (22), and so WARP is true. 
Q.E.D. 
Thus, IIA and WARP are intimately close: WARP is an apparent strengthening of 
IIA, and with a pairwise-n-complete family U they are simply equivalent. SARP is a 
further strengthening of WARP; the purpose of it will be clarified in what follows. 
Now we state interrelations among the rest of axioms together with WARP and H 
(i.e., IIA). 
Proposition 2 For an arbitrary U, WARP implies CH. 
Indeed, let WARP be true, and under the premise of CH, let the left part in (27) be 
fulfilled, and assume that x• = c(X). Take a set X"" E {X"} such that x• EX"". Then, 
x, x* and X, X"" satisfy the premise of WARP, hence x* = x. Q.E.D. 
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The converse implication in Proposition 2 is generally not true: if U = { X, X'}, where 
X = {x,y,z}, X' = {y,z,w}, and c(X) = y, c(X') = z, then CH is fulfilled but WARP 
fails .  
Proposition 3 For an arbitrary U, CH implies both H and C. Conversely, when U is 
U-complete, then H & C implies CH. 
Indeed, let CH be fulfilled. With the condition (20) in the premise �f H, coiisider the 
one-member family {X} as a covering family for X'. Then, owing to CH, c(X') = c(X). 
As for C, it is simply a special case of CH when the covering is the decomposition. 
Conversely, let both H and C be true and U be U-complete. Take an arbitrary X E U 
and its arbitrary covering {X"}vEN c;; U, and consider Xu = UvEN X" which belongs to 
U by assumption. Then under the premise in (25) we obtain c(Xu) = x due to C, and 
finally, if x E X, then c(X) = x due to H, hence (25) in CH is true. Q.E.D .  
Thus, CH i s  generally a strengthening of  the conjunction H & C, and with U-complete 
family U they are equivalent. 
Proposition 4 If U is irreducible, then H is equivalent to CH. 
Indeed, let H be true, and let (26) and the premise of (27) in Def 8 of CH be fulfilled. 
Then due to the irreducibility of U there exists X"* E X" such that X c;; X"*, and owing 
to H the conclusion of (27) is true. The converse implication of H from CH has been 
established in Proposition 3. 
Proposition 5 For an arbitrary U, RA is equivalent to CH. 
To prove this statement, it is sufficient to show the following. 
Lemma 1 For any x E X E U, the left-hand side in (28) is equivalent to the existence 
of a covering family {X"}vEN for the given X, such that the left-hand side in (27) is 
fulfilled. 
Proof. Given x E X E  U, let the left-hand side in (27) be true for some {X"} covering 
X. Then each y E X belongs to some set XY from the family {X"}, with x = c(XY), 
hence xRcy, and so the left-hand side in (28) is true. Conversely, let the left-hand side in 
(28) be fulfilled for given x E X E U. Then, for every y E X due to the very definition 
of 19-c, there exists XY E U  such that x = c(XY), y E XY. So vve obtain a desired co·vering 
family {X"}yEX for the given X 3 x, which satisfies the left-hand side in (27). \} 
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Thus, RA is in fact an explicit expression for the implicit idea of decomposing ratio­
nal choice which underlies the CH axiom and the primary H & C axioms. To elucidate 
this idea, let us transform the condition H into its equivalent form which is a straight 
conversion, or a "mirror reflection," of the condition C: 
Definition 4' We shall say that a single choice function c satisfies the heredity con­
dition, H, if for every X E U and for its every decomposition {X".JVEN in U, i.e. for 
every family of sets from U satisfying (24), and such that a given x EX belongs to every 
X", v EN, holds 
x = c(X) ==? (Vv E N: x = c(X")). (30) 
On noticing that every subset X' <;;; X together with X itself forms a decomposition 
of X, it is easy to see that Def 4' is equivalent to Def 4. As an immediate consequence 
of (25) and (30), we obtain 
Proposition 6 For an arbitrary U, the conjunction H & C is equivalent to the following 
property HC: for every XE U, for every x EX, and for every decomposition {X"}vEN
of X such that x E nvEN X", the following Condorcet-Sen condition holds: 
x = c(X) {==? (Vv EN: x = c(X")). (31) 
Now everything is prepared to present short and transparent proofs of principal cri­
teria of choice function rationality. 
Theorem 1 (Richter, 1971). With an arbitrary U, for a single choice function c to be 
rational it is necessary and sufficient that c satisfies RA. 
Proof. If c satisfies RA, then it is obviously rational since it is already represented by 
(29) in the form (16). Conversely, if c is rational, i .e. , satisfies (16) with some R, then it 
is easy to verify directly that c satisfies RA. Indeed, in such a case (Vy E X : xRcY) ==?
(Vy EX :JX• EU: x = c(X"),y EX")==? (Vy EX: xRy) ==? x = c(X), i .e. , the 
converse implication in (29) (from right to left) is .true; .the direct .implication, as it was 
already said, is evident. \} 
The following are versions of the fundamental theorem of Sen, 1971, where the con­
junction of H & C is proposed as the criterion of choice rationality under a complete 
U. 
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Theorem 2 (Mirkin,1979) . With an arbitrary U, for a single choice function c to be 
rational it is  necessary and sufficient that c satisfies CH. 
This theorem is now obtained as a direct corollary from Theorem 1 and Proposition 
5. 
Theorem 3 With an arbitrary U, for a single choice function c to be rational, WARP 
is sufficient. 
,;;; _. ! 
This theorem follows from Theorem 2 and Proposition 2. 
Theorem 4 With an arbitrary U,  for a single choice function c to be rational it 1s 
necessary, and if U is U-complete, it is also sufficient that c satisfies H & C. 
This theorem is a direct corollary from Theorem 2 and Proposition 3. 
Theorem 5 If U is 2-complete, then for a single choice function c to be rational it is 
necessary and sufficient that c satisfies H & C. 
Proof. Let c satisfy H & C. Then, owing to Proposition 6, the equivalence (31) holds 
for any two-element sets xv EU as well. So we obtain the Condorcet equation
x = c(X) �(Vy EX: x = c({x, y} ) )  (32) 
which in fact rationalizes c by the relation xRy � x = c( { x, y }  ) . Conversely, let 
c be rationalized by some R in (16) . Then fulfilling the conditions H and C follows 
immediately from their definitions. y 
As a corollary from Theorems 2 and 5, we obtain, in addition to Proposition 2 ,  one 
more case of U that provides the equivalence of conditions CH and H & C: 
Proposition 7 If U is 2-complete, then conditions CH and H & C are equivalent. 
The following theorem is a corollary from-Theorem 2 and Proposition 4. 
Theorem 6 If U is irreducible, then for a single choice function c to be rational it is 
necessary and sufficient that c satisfies H. 
Now we shall present some criteria of narrow rationality (Def. 1).
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Theorem 7 (Richter, 1966, 1971;  Suzumura, 1977) With an arbitrary U, for a single 
choice function c to be rational in the narrow sense, it is necessary and sufficient that c 
satisfies SARP. 
The proof of this theorem is relatively difficult, and since we do not need it in the 
sequel, we omit it (see, e.g., Richter, 1971,  Corollary 1 from Theorem 8). 
The following theorem is a version of Theorem 3 in Arrow, 1959, 
Theorem 8 With a 3-complete U, for a single choice function c to be rational in the 
narrow sense, it is necessary and sufficient that c satisfies WARP. 
To prove this theorem for single-valued choice, consider the following statement which 
can be extracted from the reasoning in Remark 5. 
Lemma 2 If U is 3-complete, then for single choice functions the (broad) rationality is 
equivalent to the narrow rationality. 
We can now see that sufficiency in Theorem 8 follows from Theorem 3 and Lemma 
2. As for necessity, it easily follows from the definitions. \J
The given proof of Theorem 8 is one of the few among the preceding statements 
and proofs, which essentially exploits the single-valuedness of choice. The rest of those 
are rather easily (often almost litera1ly) extendable onto the general multiple (set-wise) 
choice. Now we shall consider some other statements where the single-valuedness of 
choice is vitally important. 
Proposition 8 With an arbitrary U, for single choice functions H implies C. 
The proof of this proposition is completely parallel to that of Proposition 2 above. 
Theorem 9 (Uzawa, 1956) If U is 3-complete, then for a single choice function c on U 
to be rational, and, equivalently, to be narrow rational, it is necessary and sufficient that 
c satisfies H (i.e. , IIA). 
Proof. By virtue of Propositions 7 and 8, under 3-completeness of U we have H <¢==?- H 
& C <¢==?- CH. By virtue of Theorem 2, this is equivalent to the rationality, and owing to 
Lemma 2 also to the narrow rationality of single choice functions on U. \J 
From collation of Theorems 1 ,2 ,5,8 and 9, we obtain, as a strengthening of Proposition 
1 ,  a deeper connection of IIA, i.e., H, with other conditions on single choice functions c 
on 3-complete families U. 
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Proposition 9 If U is 3-complete, then for single choice functions on U the conditions 
H ,  WARP, SARP, CH, H & C and RA are equivalent. 
Finally, here is one more particular type of families U in which the condition H is 
equivalent to rationality of single choice functions. 
Theorem 10 If U is pairwise-n-complete, then for a single choice Junction c to be ra­
tional it is necessary and sufficient that c satisfies H. 
Proof. Sufficiency follows from Theorem 3 and Proposition 1, and necessity from The­
orem 2 and Proposition 3. \1 
Now we shall briefly touch upon the general case of multiple (set-wise) choice. The 
forms of expressions, as used above for single choice, can in fact be applied word by word 
to this general case as well. What is needed is the replacement of the equality x = c( X) 
by the inclusion x E C(X). With such replacement, all the definitions of conditions 
H (formerly IIA) ,  C, CH, RA (and HC in Proposition 6), as well as Theorems 1-6 and 
8 are still valid together with their proofs given mutatis mutandis; the same relates to 
Propositions 1 (except the converse part of its statement) and 2-7. As for the definitions 
of WARP and SARP in the set-wise case, they need a more careful approach, and with 
their appropriate formulations the statements of Theorems 7 and 8 still remain valid (see, 
e.g. , Suzumura, 1976) ; but we do not need them here. All we need in the sequel are the 
very ideas of abstract versions of "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (or heredity 
H) ,  of concordance C, and of their amalgamation, concordant heredity CH. In fact, these 
conditions remain in the general case without changes, except for the replacement of 
x = c(X) by x E C(X). 
The following theorem will help elucidate the role of conditions H and C taken sepa­
rately.1 Here the general case of set-wise choice is considered, so in the definitions of H 
and C one should take x E C(X) instead of x = c(X) (though one may continue to deal 
with the particular case, a single choice x = c(X)) .  
Theorem 11  For an arbitrary U, a choice function C satisfies H or, respectively, C iff 
it is representable in the semirational form 
C(X) = {x E X  I Vy : xR(X)y},  X E  U, (33) 
with a pseudorelation R( X) decreasing (respectively, increasing) in X, in the sense that 
if X' <;:; X, then xR(X)y =? (resp., .t;=)xR(X')y. 
1This theorern1 established by the author, has been published in a collection of papers which is hardly 
accessible to a Western reader; its equivalent version in English was quoted in the survey by Aizerman, 
1986. 
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This theorem will follow from the results of Section 4. It is clear that the conventional 
rational case ( 17) is the case when a pseudorelation R(X) is indeed a true relation, i.e., 
it is in fact independent on X. This means that formally R(X) is both (nonstrictly) 
decreasing and increasing in X. (Caution: for an arbitrary U, out of cases given in Theo­
rems 4 and 5, even under H & C there may be no such a relation R. Then pseudorelations 
R(X) in representations of the form (33) for H and for C must be different) .  
It is necessary to remark that extention of some rationality conditions from a single 
choice onto a multiple choice can be performed in different ways. Consider the case of the 
extention of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Above such an extention was carried 
out by simply replacing x = c(X) by x E C (X) ; this leads to the following set-wise form 
of the condition H: if X, X' E U  and X' <;;; X, then 
c(x) n x' c;;; c(x'). (34) 
However, this is not the only natural way of extending IIA from a single onto a multiple 
choice. Among other possibilities we shall choose and use in the sequel one from Chernoff, 
1954 - Postulate 5*; Jamison and Lau, 1973 - Axiom 2; Aizerman and Malishevski, 
1981 - Condition O; Schwartz, 1986 - Condition W7; Bordes, 1986 - "Strong Superset 
Condition" : 
Definition 10 We shall say that a set-wise choice function C on U satisfies the condition 
of outcasting of rejected alternatives, 0, if for every X, X' E U such that X' <;;; X, holds 
X* = C (X), X* <;;; X' ==? X* = C (X') . (35) 
This definition in fact treats the choice set C(X) as a whole, as a direct counterpart 
of the choosen element c(X) in the single-choice formulation of IIA (see (20) , (21) above) . 
This treatment of the condition 0 will be examined in Section 4. 
3. Examination of behavior rationality in some models
Here we shall consider three particular models of d_ecision making: one describes 
consumer choice and two others represent the cases of hypochoice and hyperchoice in the 
abstract choice model given in Section 1 .  
I . Let us  start with a nonconventional model of consumer choice under rationing 
of consumption. This model was proposed by KM.Braverman, 1976, as an attempt 
to describe the former Soviet-type economics of shortages. In this model the variables 
which affect the consumer behavior are the given limitations on the feasible commodity 
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quantities. The prices and income values may still exist, but they ought to be fixed 
and so they may be removed from the explicit description of the person's behavior as a 
function of variable parameters. 
Let x = (x1, . . .  , xn ) , as earlier, be a commodity bundle, and let b = (b1 , . . .  , bn) be 
the vector of admissible upper bounds for consumption of corresponding goods, b E R';: . 
Following Braverman, 1976, with a slight modification, let us introduce the dependence 
of the commodity bundle consumed, x, on the .limitation .vector b E R';: : x = .. f(b), 
called consumer choice function. This function must obey the obvious condition 
(36) 
Definition 11  We shall say that the consumer choice function f(b) is normal, if for any 
b, b' such that 
holds 
f;(b) = b; = b; = b, 
f;(b) < b; = b; :::: f,(b) 
f(b) = f(b') . 
This normality condition yields an axiomatic description of consumer choice. 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
Consider this model from the choice theory standpoint. For an outside observer 
f(b) plays the role of a choice function c(X(b)) defined on a family U = {X(b)}bEB of 
admissible sets in U = R';: : 
x (b) = { x E R� I 0 -; x -; b}, (40) 
where B is a parameter set; in particular, but not necessarily, we can take B = R'.f-. It is 
easy to see, that a) a family U is irreducible (Def.3) and b) a normal choice function J(b) 
on U satisfies the condition H, i.e. , independence of irrelevant alternatives. The latter is 
a direct corollary of n�rmality (37)-(39) (and moreover, is equivalent to normality under 
continuity of f(b)) .  To see the fulfillment of H it is enough to take X(b') <;::: X(b), 
with f(b) E X(b'), which implies f(b) < b' < b. Therefore the premise (37) and (38) of 
normality is fulfilled,henc;e..the-00nciu�-0n.(39) -nrn�t -be .1;i>ue,-and-4lo JI .  is ·satisfied. Using 
Theorem 6, we obtain 
Statement 1 The normal consumer choice in Braverman's model is  rational for the 
outside observer., i .e . ,  when considerinf' f{b) as the sine:le choice function c(X(b)) e:iven U \. I '-' ' / 1 .._.. 
on a family U = {X(b)hEB of admissible sets of the form (40) ,  with an arbitrary B. 
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In other words, the consumer choice f(b) here may be "explained" by means of 
optimization of the form (16) on X(b) with some preference relation R on R+ (or, 
equivalently, of the form (18) with some strict preference relation P on R+) .  
We emphasize that above we meant rationality in the broad, not in the narrow sense. 
The latter is generally false for Braverman's model, which can be seen from the following 
example. Take n = 3, b1 = (a, 1, 1 ) , b2 = ( 1 , a, l ) , b3 = (1 , 1, a) (with p = ( 1 , 1 , 1 )  and 
I = 2a + 1 ,  if one wishes to take into account the .budget .constraint explicitly), and let 
f(b1 ) = (a, a, 1) , f(b2) = (1 , a, a) and f(b3) = (a, l , a) .  Then one can easily see that 
SARP is violated, hense the narrow rationality is impossible here. 
Let us recall that in a monetary economy, even under the conditions of deficit, the 
consumer has to obey the budget constraint pf(b) :S: I, or, in terms of the budget set 
B = B(p, I) in (2) (remember that p and I are fixed), the condition 
f(b) E B. ( 41 ) 
The presence of the budget constraint and perhaps other considerations may force the 
consumer to abandon the "best" corner point b (here we implicitly suppose that all 
commodities are desirable) in the set X (b) admissible to him as seen by the outside 
observer, and to choose a point f(b) which is typically :S: b. From the consumer's 
standpoint, it is natural to consider as admissible the narrower sets of the form 
( 42) 
The budget constraint is essential only if pb > I, i.e., when XI (b) is indeed smaller than 
X(b). 
Let us consider the following example. Let n = 2, p = (1, 1 ) ,  I = 4, and b = 
(3, 3) ,  b1 = ( 4, 2),  b11 = (2, 4).  Let f(b) = (3, 1)  and f(b1) = f(b11) = (2, 2). Then 
for the set B = {b, b', b11} the normality condition is fulfilled, and hence, both for 
u = {X(b)}bEB and U1 = {X1(b)}bEB the condition H is valid. However, because of 
(43) 
the condition CH is violated (and even more so WARP also fails, which can be seen inde­
pendently by comparing X(b) and X(b')) .  Therefore, due to Theorem 2, the described 
consumer choice is irrational when considering the sets X1 (b) admissible. 
The reason for the discrepancy between this conclusion and Statement 1 is that a 
possible "rational explanation" of consumer choice, as seen by the outside observer, 
requires a specific feature of the strict preference P in ( 18). Namely, the element x = (2, 2) 
belonging to each of X(b), X(b'), X(b"), and chosen in X(b') and X(b") but rejected 
in X(b), can be dominated in X(b) only by some y E X(b)\(X(b') U X(b")) ,  so that 
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y E X(b)\X1(b). This means that y dominating x in fact is not the commodity bundle 
which might have been considered by the consumer as a feasible alternative. (I avoid 
the word "preferable" because WARP is violated here). So, from the consumer's point 
of view, the explanation of the choice by means of such a preference P is not valid. 
This example raises the following question: is it possible to obtain any result about 
the rationality, based only on external observations of the admissible sets X(b ) ,  without 
knowing the budget set B, and hence by knowing "true" feasible sets X 1 (b) only incom­
pletely? The answer is "yes." To show this, let us consider a special but rather natural 
type of parameter sets B. 
Definition 12 We shall call a set B rectangular if it represents a Cartesian product 
B = 81 X . . .  X Bn of some sets B,.
The examples of rectangular sets B would be B = R'.j., or more generally, B = {b  E 
Rn I o ;;: b ;;: b} .  It is easy to see that rectangularity implies the following property: for
every b', b" EB it is true that min{b', b"} E B, where min{b', b"} denotes the n-vector 
with components min{bi, bi'} ,  i = 1 ,  . . .  , n. 
Lemma 3 If the parameter set B is rectangular, then the family U = {X1(b)}bEB is 
pairwise-n-complete. 
Proof. It is clear that X(b') n x(b") = X(b), where b = min(b', b"), and furthermore 
X1(b') n x1(b") = X1(b). Since due to rectangularity of B, b', b" EB implies b EB 
then U is pairwise-n-complete. \J 
Statement 2 Independent of the fixed but unknown budget set B, if the family B is 
rectangular then the normal consumer choice in Braverman 's model is rational when 
considering f(b) as a single choice function c(X 1 (b) ) ,  given on a family U { X 1 (b ) }bEB of 
inner subjectively admissible sets. 
Proof. By Theorem 9 and Lemma 3, and since J(b) as a single choice function satisfies 
the condition H,-J(b) .m us.t.be.,rational. \J
We have thus considered a case, where we can assert the rationality of a person's 
behavior in spite of our lack of complete knowledge of the person's subjective view on 
admissible sets. 
II. Let us consider now the case of hypochoice in the abstract choice model sketched
in Section 1 .  Let us admit that a given choice function C : U -+ 2u yields empty values 
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on some subfamily u0 = {X E U I C(X) = 0} .  Suppose for simplicity that on the rest 
of U, i.e., on U* = U\U0, the function C is singleton-valued, so C is a single-or-empty 
choice function on U, describing a single choice with the possibility of indecisiveness. 
As discussed in Section 1, the phenomenon of the empty choice, or abstaining from 
choice, can be considered a new imagined alternative; denote it f. Then we obtain 
the new, extended totality of alternatives [J = U U{f}, the new family of admissible 
representations U = {X LJ{f} I X  E U} and the new, purely single-valued choice function 
c on U defined as 
-(x f) _ 
[ x if C(X) = {x} , (44) c u -
l f if C(X) = 0. 
Call it surrogate choice function. The family U is evidently incomplete, even when U is 
complete, because U contains no sets that do not include f. 
The rationality of the initial function C does not guarantee the rationality of its 
surrogate c. Indeed, consider the simplest case of two primary options: U = { x, y} ,  U is  
complete for U, and C on U is given by C( {x})  = x, C( {y}) = {y  } ,  C( { x, y})  = 0.  It is  
the situation of Buridan's ass in front of two equivalent piles of hay. This choice function 
is rational: it is rationalized by the non-antisymmetric dominance relation P of the form 
xPy and yPx in (18) . Nevertheless, the corresponding surrogate choice function c cannot 
be rational since c({x, y, f}) = f but c({x ,f} )  = x, which contradicts IIA (H). Thus, 
Buridan's ass is eventually seen as irrational. 
Now consider the general case and examine conditions of the rationality for surrogate 
choice functions c. For this purpose the general criterion, the condition CH (Theorem 2), 
can be applied. The application of CH, i.e., (26) , (27), is reduced to two separate cases: 
a) x E U - then the criterion demands the satisfaction of CH, i .e. , the rationality of the
single-or-empty choice function C on U; 
b) x = f - then the criterion is reduced to the following requirement: for all X E U and 
{X"}vEN <::; U0 such that X <::; UvENX" one obtains C(X) = 0, i .e. , X E  U0. 
Case (b) can be described in other terms as follows. Denote u0 = U{ x I x E u0} .
Then the requirement of CH in (b) is equivalent to 
Thus we obtain 
Statement 3 For the surrogate choice function c ( 44) to be rational it is necessary and 
sufficient that a) the original choice function C is rational, and b) the equation (45) 
holds. 
To interpret equation ( 45), let us call u0 the set of conditionally unfit alternatives. 
Then ( 45) means that the person refrains from (real) choice if and only if the admissible 
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(real) alternative set consists entirely of conditionally unfit alternatives. Here the word 
"conditionally" implies that a conditionally unfit alternative might be chosen, when not 
all present alternatives are unfit. The example is a modification of the above Buridan's 
ass case, when an extra real alternative z is added and when U = { { x, y } ,  { x ,  z }, {y, z}}
with C({x, y} )  = 0, C({x, z})  = {x } ,  C({y ,z } )  = {y}. The primary function C on U is 
obviously rationalized by the following P: xPz, yPz, xPy, yPx, and the surrogate c on 
U is rationalized, in addition, by zP f. The alternatives x and y are conditionally unfit, 
and each of them is chosen in the corresponding context. 
A stronger and more natural result is obtained when the family U is I-complete, 
i.e., it includes all singletons. Note that usually "choice" from one-element sets is not
considered, being implicitly treated as a degenerate case , especially when the strong 
rationality requirement does not allow empty choice. (The former Soviet "elections" on 
the principle "one seat - one candidate" were the real example of the "choice" of such 
kind). But if one accepts the possibility of empty choice, then the choice from singletons, 
Hobson's choice 2 becomes meaningful and can lead to useful results. Let us consider 
an alternative which is rejected when presented alone. In terms of the conventional 
rational choice the alternative x such that C( { x}) = 0 must be self dominant in the sense 
that xPx. Therefore such alternatives shall not be chosen in any other situation, when 
together with other arbitrary alternatives; so they may be called absolutely unfit. In spite 
of the ultimate simplicity, the inclusion of such alternatives into consideration may yield 
a useful extension of the traditional framework of choice rationality (a display of such a 
phenomenon can be found in the survey of Aizerman, I985, and also, in an implicit form, 
in Bertel, I988). Returning to the above construct, we can see that in case of I-complete 
family U each conditionally unfit alternative turns out to be absolutely unfit: indeed, 
owing to ( 43) , 
x E U0 � C({x}) = 0,  (46) 
and so x E u0 ¢? (xPx or f Px) for every possible rationalization of c. Thus, in the
case of I-completeness of U Statement 3 can be extended to 
Statement 4 If U is I -complete, then in addition to conditions of Statement 3, under 
rationality of c the following is true: 
x E U0 ¢? VX E U :  (x fj C(X)). ( 47) 
III. Now we shall consider the general case of set-wise choice function C(X) when the
condition IC(X) = I is not assumed. We shall call this general case �]!perchoice, now 
� 
2 Hobson's choice, the choice of taking either that which is offered or nothing; the absence of a real 
choice or alternative. [after Thomru; Hobson ( 1544-1631), of Cambridge, England, who rented horses 
and gave his customer only one choice, that of the horse nearest the stable door]. (Webster's Dictionary) 
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using a wider meaning of this term, viz., not requiring that I C(X) I > 1 for each X, but 
admitting that I C(X) I =  1 (single choice) or even I C(X) I =  0 (empty choice) for some 
X E U. Following the approach described in Section 1 ,  we will treat such a choice as that 
of composite objects, viz., of initial object sets taken as a whole. From this standpoint, 
the presentation of a set X � U of initial objects x, y, . . . E X  means the presentation of 
the set X = 2x of mentioned composite objects Y, Z, . . .  � X. 
For a given choice function C : U -+ 2u we introduce . . ..the surrogate. single choice 
function c :  U -+  U, where [! =  2u, 11 = {2x I X  E U}, and c(X), X � U, is defined as 
(48) 
The set C(X) in the right-hand side of (48) is treated as a point in the set [! =  2u, 
this meaning that c is actually the single-valued choice function. 
Let us examine the rationality of c. Note that its domain, the family U, is incomplete 
(unless U contains only singletons) :  X E 11 cannot contain some X without containing 
every Y � X at the same time. However, 11 possesses an important property: 
Lemma 4 For an arbitrary U, the corresponding surrogate family U is always irre­
ducible. 
Proof. Let X E 11, {X"}vEN � 11 and X � UvEN X". Then X = 2x and X" -
2X" , v E N, for some X, X" E U  (v E N), with 2x � UvEN 2X". The latter means that 
for some X* E {X"} holds X � X*, hence X = 2x � 2x• = X* for some X* E {X"} .  
\l 
(It is easy to verify also that if U is pairwise-n-complete then so is 11). 
It follows from Lemma 4 and Theorem 6 that the surrogate single choice function 
c on U is rational if and only if it satisfies the condition H. It is easy to see that the 
condition H for c on 11 is actually equivalent to the condition 0 (Def. 10) for the original 
set-wise choice function C on U. Thus we obtain 
Statement 5 Let C : U -+ 2u be a set-wise choice function. For the corresponding 
surrogate single .. choic.e_function :c ... (.48) .on. U to .ha.rational .it. i s  . . necessary and sufficient 
that C satisfies the condition 0. 
Let us interpret the fact of rationality of the surrogate choice function c in terms of 
the initial choice function C. This fact shall mean that there exists a binary relation R 
on 2u, we shaii caii it hyperrelation, such that 
C(X) = X* such that \IY � X :  X*RY (49) 
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(we assume that C(X) in (49) is well defined, i.e., the corresponding X* <;;; X is unique). 
The expression ( 49) has been introduced in Aizerman and Malishevski, 1 981 ,  as the 
hyperdominant choice mechanism. Statement 5 above presents a reformulation (in a 
generalized form - for arbitrary U) of Theorem 7 in Aizerman and Malishevski, 1981; it 
says that a choice function C : U --> 2u is generable by a hyperdominant mechanism 
( 49) if and only if it satisfies the condition 0. Now we have interpreted such an ability 
to generate a choice function satisfying 0 on a different level, namely .on .the level of 
object bundles taken as composite alternatives. This interpretation was given in terms 
of a single choice of such composite alternatives. 
Note that the former problem of rationality for the hypochoice is now embedded 
into the latter more general problem for hyperchoice. The empty bundle X* = 0 here 
is treated as equally eligible, and the application of the rationality criterion (condition 
H for surrogate choice or, equivalently, 0 for original choice) immediately leads to the 
notions of conditionally unfit or, with I-complete U, absolutely unfit objects in the same 
manner as it has been done in the previous hypochoice analysis. 
To complete, let us pose this additional question: under what conditions is a choice 
function C : U --> 2u representable in the form of the hyperscale optimization 
C(X) = X* such that X* = arg max V(Y), (50) 
where V(Y) is a hyperscale, viz. ,  a mapping V :  2u --> L (L is a linearly ordered set)?
The answer is easily obtained by means of Theorem 7, applying SARP to the surrogate 
choice function c ( 48), which in terms of the original C yields the following hyper-SARP 
formulation: for any X1 , . . .  , xn E U, n > 1 ,  holds
X•i - C(Xi) X*i c xi+1 . - 1 X*1 - - x•n - , _ , z , . . .  , n ==? . . . . 
The final result can be formulated as follows: 
(51) 
Statement 6 With an arbitrary U, for a set-wise choice function C :  U -->  2U to admit a
hyperscale optimizational representation (50) it is necessary and sufficient that C satisfies 
hyper-SARP (51) .  
In this section we thus considered applications of the rationality criteria which have 
been elaborated earlier for the conventional choice-theoretical models. We applied those 
criteria to three problems while demonstrating the step-by-step departure from the com­
mon view of alternatives. In the first problem, Braverman's model, the admissible al­
ternative sets were allowed to be partially unobservable. In the second problem, the 
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hypochoice, the initial totality of options was augmented by an artificial "irreal" alter­
native. And in the third problem, the hyperchoice, we changed the very nature of the 
original totality of options by switching to the newly created totality of alternatives. 
The next step, the complete refusal from an explicit consideration of alternatives in the 
question of rationality of behavior, will be made in the following section. 
4. A model of rational decisions with hidden alternatives
As mentioned in the Introduction, the common notion of decision making as of select­
ing an alternative among a set of admissible alternatives admits different modes of for­
malization. The most refined formalization, the abstract scheme in the choice theory, has 
been presented in Section 2. The key concept of this theory is the choice correspondence 
(function): the admissible alternative set X >-+ the chosen alternative(s) c(X) (C(X)) .  
It should b e  noted that already in earlier works on the choice theory some other types of 
correspondences had been considered, such as an explicit dependency C = C(X; R) on
the underlying preference relation R, or on the "profile" R = (Ri , . . .  , Rn) of individual
preferences fl;, when a collective choice is considered (Arrow, 1963; Sen, 1970), or a 
dependency on the variable composition of a group (Smith, 1973), and so on. Moreover, 
the decision problem itself can be formulated not as a selection among primary objects 
named alternatives but a selection among other, secondary objects such as, e.g. , a group 
ordering of primary alternatives. In the latter case it is the orderings of primary alter­
natives that deserve the name of true alternatives in front of DM rather tha.n primary 
ones. Nevertheless, the alternatives and dependences of the chosen alternatives on some 
"experiment conditions" are present in each typical statement of the decision problem. 
Now we shall make an important step and abandon an explicit consideration of alter­
natives in the formulation of the problem. The prerequisite for such a step lies implicitly 
in the Samuelson's idea of revelation of preferences which serves as a source for an implicit 
judgement of the rationality of decisions. We take Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed 
Preferences and give it an equivalent form that is more convenient for the explication of 
the idea needed: for any X, X' E U 
X' 3 c(X) => either c(X') = c(X) or c(X') cf. X. (52) 
The premise (1eft�hand-side)··of{52) ·means·nhat-·the"Teplacernent "Of the former admissible 
set X by a new one X' is such that the former best choice c( X) still remains admissible, 
hence it is natural to believe that the new position (opportunity scope) of DM is at 
least as good as the old one. The two possibilities considered in the right-hand side of 
(52) mean that the new position is, respectively, either not better than the old one -
and so DN1 does not change his decision, or is even better - and then Divi makes a new 
decision which could not have been made in the old position (so the new choice c(X') 
29 
is "revealingly better" than the old c(X)) . Thus, the Samuelson's approach implies the 
idea of implicit comparison of worth of two opportunity scopes. 
The formulation of WARP demands the explicit indication of the chosen alternatives. 
However, the corresponding formulation of its close variation, IIA (see Proposition 1 ) ,  
permits to  avoid such indication in  the premise of the statement. Indeed, the equivalent 
formulation of IIA parallel to (52) has the following form: for any X, X' EU 
> - , ,  -
X' 2 X =? either c(X') = c(X) or c(X') tf. X. (53) 
As compared with (52), the only change we introduce is the change of the premise: 
the new one, X' 2 X, does not require the condition X' 3 c(X) since this is already 
warranted by the condition X' 2 X itself. What remains is the next step: to abandon
the explicit indication of the chosen alternatives in the right-hand side of (53) as well. For 
this purpose we shall formalize the notions of opportunity scope and value of opportunity 
scope. 
As a particular case of an opportunity scope, one may consider the explicit indication 
of the set of the admissible alternatives, X, or of a parameter characterizing such a set. 
The example of the latter may be the classical budget set B(p, I) given by its parameters 
p, I or the nonclassical consumer admissible set in Braverman's model, X(b ) ,  given by 
the parameter b, etc. Moreover, an opportunity scope in general may be given implicitly 
by indicating the "experiment conditions" under which the decision maker shall demean. 
For example, the behavior of an undertaker is determined by the legislation under which 
he does his business. We can possess the exact and complete text of legislation but not 
know the alternative modes of behavior available to the businessman. Furthermore, we 
may estimate (or obtain by inquiry) the value of the current opportunity scope that is
the best (highest) from DM's standpoint (e.g., an expected maximal profit) . We denote
the opportunity scope, independent of its nature, by X and save the notation U for the 
family of possible opportunity scopes; then we introduce the scope value as a function 
v : U --> L, where L is a linearly ordered set. Thus, v(X),  X E U, is a scale of values
of opportunity scopes, and we can now introduce the axiomatic conditions of behavior 
rationality in terms of the function v. Note that the well-known indirect utility function, 
which for a classical model of consumer of the form ( 1 )  is just the optimal value of the 
achievable utility: v(p, I) = maxx > o,px < I  u(x), may be considered an example of the 
scope value. 
= = 
In what follows, we consider a simple model in which the opportunity scopes are finite 
sets of elements from some primary opportunity space U. Then the family U consists of 
some feasible sets of available point-wise opportunities, like in the case of alternative sets. 
We shall use the terminology from Def 3 when speaking about various types of families 
U. As an example of a situation where an "opportunity space" is modelled as a space 
in the set-theoretical sense, we consider a simple case of legislation in which each "law" 
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has a form of "bill of rights". Then the totality of all conceivable rights forms the set U, 
every possible "right" is considered as a point of U, every "law" is a finite set X c:;:: U, 
and usual set-theoretical notions and operations are meaningful, in the sense that they 
form new legislations from the old ones. Note that different x E U here are "rights" ,  
which create opportunities for admissible alternative modes of behavior, but in no case 
x's are alternatives themselves for DM's choice. 
Let us introduce the first condition of rationality in terms of the scope.value v,  which 
is a direct analogue of IIA in the form ( 53) .
Definition 13 We shall say that a scope value v : U ---+ L satisfies the monotonicity
condition, M, if for any X, X' E U 
X' ;;;> X =? v(X') 2: v(X). (54) 
This condition looks quite convincing: the more possibilities, the better. How­
ever, sometimes one might dispute this thesis. Recall Buridan's ass: the appearance 
of the second pile of hay worsens his position. Another reason for a worsening sit­
uation after enlarging the opportunity scope can be, e.g., an additional expense on 
the choice procedure (information processing etc). A formal violation of the condi­
tion M is presented in Game example 2 in Section 1 .  There, the optimal expected
gain e(i*) of DM, player 1 (viz., his regret with the opposite sign) for three possi­
ble actions I = { 1 , 2, 3} is e(l )  = - maXjEJ w1j = -2, but the optimal e(i*') for
I' = { 1 ,  2} i s  e(2) = - maXjEJ w;j = -1 . Thus, e(i*') > e(i*) , i.e., the gain increases
after narrowing the set of possible actions, which plays the role of the opportunity set 
for DM. 
This example, perhaps, looks a little artificial since the elements of the virtual payoff 
matrix, viz., of the regret matrix, change when changing the set of DM's actions. To 
avoid this shortcoming, consider still another game example. 
Game example 3. Consider the well-known game the battle of the sexes, (see, e.g., 
Luce and Raiffa, 1957), the bimatrix game with the payoff bimatrix 
[ (2, 1 ).... . (.0, 0.) (0, 0) )(1,.2) (55) 
where elements Vij and Uij of an ij-th entry (v;j, Uij )  denote rewards of the players 1
and 2, respectively, when player 1 performs the action i E I and player 2 the action
j E J. Let us again use Stackelberg's approach, with player 2 being the leader and 
player 1 the follower. To describe the corresponding solution of the game, denote i0(j) = 
arg maxjEJVij ·  Then the optimal action of player 2 is j* = arg maxiEIUio(j),j and of player1 is i* = arg maxiEIVij• · It is easy to see that in the above game (where I =  { 1 ,  2} and
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J = { l ,  2}) we have j* = 2, i* = 2 and the optimal reward of player 1 is Vi•j• = v22 = 1 .  
However, if  one changes the game by canceling the second action of player 1 ,  so that 
I' = { 1 } ,  then we obtain j* = 1 ,  i* = 1, and DM's reward becomes v11 = 2. Thus, adding 
a second possible action for DM only decreases his reward. 
Therefore, the condition M is not universally true, but is simply a plausible assump­
tion for a class of behavioral situations. The following condition is meaningful for a rather 
wide class of situations, though it is more restrictive and less evident than monotonicity. 
This condition, as opposed to M, requires that if, while enlarging the opportunity scope, 
an increase of the scope value takes place, then this increase should be not too large. 
Namely, if the opportunity scope is decomposed into several parts (with possible overlap­
ping), then the value of the whole scope must not exceed the maximal value for its parts. 
This condition implicitly demands that the union of several opportunity scopes would 
not have created "essentially new" opportunities, which would yield a reward more than 
that for all opportunities contained in the initial scopes. In other words, more powerful 
opportunities cannot emerge as a result of merging some old ones. 
Definition 14 Let X <;; U be a family of admissible opportunity scopes X <;; U. Intro­
duce the hypervalue of X as 
V(X) = max v(X) . (56) xEX 
Definition 15 We shall say that a scope value v on U satisfies the nonemergence condi­
tion, N, if for every X E U  and for every its decomposition ;\:' in U, i.e., a family ;\:' <;; U 
such that UvExY = X, holds 
v(X) :S V(X). (57) 
The restrictive character of the condition N is obvious and can be illustrated by any 
counterexample in which joining several opportunities creates something essentially more 
powerful. To show it, consider 
Game example 4 .  Take the simplest zero-sum game with the payoff matrix 
(58) 
and consider .the . .standard. maximin.principle.of.beh=jor..ior.;player ,l;�it the usage of 
mixed strategies. Then the optimal maximin strategy of player 1 is (p1 , p2) = ( 1/2, 1 /2) 
with the gain (maximin expected reward) 1/2, whereas for each of the two separate
actions (pure strategies) 1 and 2 the maximin reward is 0. Thus, the creation of a new
opportunity, mixed strategy, after joining two pure strategies, leads to a violation of the 
nonemergence condition. 
Now we introduce a combined condition: 
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Definition 16 We shall say that a scope value v on U satisfies the nonemergent mono­
tonicity condition, NM, if for every X E U and for every its covering X <;;; U the inequality 
v(X) ::; V(X) is fulfilled. 
Proposition 10 For an arbitrary U, NM implies both M and N. Conversely, if U is 
U-complete, then M&N implies NM. 
Indeed, both M and N are special cases of MN: M - when X = {X'}, one-member 
family; N - when the covering ;\:' is, in fact, the decomposition of X. Conversely, let both 
M and N be satisfied. Take an arbitrary X E U and some of its covering X, and consider 
xu = LJ{X I X E X}.  Then xu 2 X, and xu E U  by virtue of U-completeness of U.
Applying sequentially conditions M and N, we obtain 
(59) 
Q.E.D. 
A small transformation of the condition M helps elucidate its role as a natural coun­
terpart of the condition N: 
Definition 13' . We shall say that a scope value v on U satisfies the monotonicity 
condition, M, if for every X E U  and for every its covering X <;;; U holds 
V(X) ::; v(X) . (60) 
It is easy to see that Definitions 13 and 13' are equivalent . 
Definition 1 7  We shall say that a scope value v on U is aggregable if for any X E U 
and {X"}vEN <;;; U such that X = UvENX", holds 
v(X) = max v(X"). vEN (61)
From the very Definitions 1 7, 13' and 15 follows 
Proposition 1 1  A scope value v on U is aggregable iff it satisfies both M and N.  
We are now in the position to  examine the inner structure of well-behaving scope 
value functions. 
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Definition 18 We shall say that a scope value v on U is primitive rational, if it satisfies 
the following separability condition: v is representable in the form 
v(X) = max w(x) 
xEX 
for every X E U, where w( x) is some generating value Junction w : U ---> L. 
(62) 
Start with the simplest cas� when the inner structure of a scop� , value function v
can be observed directly: it is the case of 1-complete families U, when values v on all 
singletons are given. 
Theorem 12 Let U be a 1-complete family. Then for a scope value v on U be primitive 
rational it is necessary and sufficient that v satisfies the conjunction of conditions M&N. 
Proof. Let M&N be satisfied. Then for every X E U  we can take as its decomposition 
the primitive decomposition X consisting of its singleton subsets: X = { { x} }xEX . Since, 
owing to proposition 11 ,  v is aggregable, holds 
v (X) = max v({x}) .  
xEX 
(63) 
We thus obtained the autoseparable representation (63) which is a special case of the sep­
arable representation (62), with w(x) = v({x}) ,  x E U. Conversely, if v is representable 
in a separable form (62), then it is easy to see that it obeys M and N. \J 
For the general case, when U may or may not contain all singletons, we need a more 
complex analysis based on the above properties. 
Definition 19 We shall say that a scope value v on U satisfies the axiom of revealed 
value, ARV, if for every X E U  holds 
v(X) :S max wv(x), (64) 
xEX 
where Wv : U ---> L is the revealed value function defined by 
wv(x) = min v (X) . (65) 
X : xEXEU 
Lemma 5 Given any X E U, the fulfillment of (57) for every X i;;; U covering X is 
equivalent to the fulfillment of (64). 
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Proof. Take an arbitrary ;t' <;;; U covering X. By definition of a covering, for every 
x E X there exists xx E ;t' such that xx 3 x. Then by definition of wv(x) , holds
Wv S v(Xx), hence
maxwv(x) S max v(Xx) S max v (Y) = V(X).xEX xEX YE.Y (66) 
Therefore, (64) implies (57) for arbitrary :t'. Conversely, denote x•x a set in ;\:' such that
wv (x) = v(X*x), and form the family ;\:'* = {X*x}xEX· Then
V(X*) = max v (X*x) = max wv (x) .xEX xEX 
Therefore, the fulfillment of (57) for any ;\:', including :t'*, implies (64). \l 
Proposition 12 Conditions NM and ARV are equivalent. 
This Proposition immediately follows from Lemma 5.
(67) 
Theorem 13 With an arbitrary U, for a scope value v on U be primitive rational it is 
necessary and sufficient that v satisfies ARV. 
Proof. First, establish the following 
Lemma 6 ARV in the form of the inequality (64) is equivalent to the equality 
v(X) = max wv(x) .xEX (68) 
Proof of Lemma 6. Due to the definition of the revealed value Wv, for each x E X 
we have wv (x) S v(X), hence
max wv (x) S v(X).xEX (69) 
Juxtaposing (69) and (64), we obtain Lemma. \J 
To prove sufficiency in Theorem, it is enough to note that the equation (68) in the 
modified AR\7 is exactly a separable representafiori of v, with wv as the generating value 
function. To prove necessity, note that if v is represented in the separable form (62), 
then for any x E X E U 
wv(x) = min v(Y) = min maxw(y ) >
Y: xEYEU Y: xEYEU yEY -
?:: min w(x) = w(x) .Y: xEYEU 
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(70) 
Therefore 
max wv(x) � maxw(x) = v(X), 
xEX xEX 
which yields ARV in the original form (64). V 
(71) 
Note that for a separable v on an arbitrary U generally wv(x) � w(x) (70); but, if U 
is 1-complete, then we can assert from the definitions of Wv and of separability of v that, 
moreover, wv(x) = w(x) = v({x}) for all x E U. 
From Theorem 1 3  and Proposition 12 we obtain 
Theorem 14 With an arbitrary U, for a scope value v on U to be primitive rational it 
is necessary and sufficient that v satisfies NM. 
Further, from Theorem 14 and Proposition 10 we obtain 
Theorem 15 With an arbitrary U, for a scope value v on U to be primitive rational it 
is necessary and, provided that U is U-complete, also sufficient that v satisfies M&N. 
Thus, Theorems 12-15 present criteria of primitive rationality (separability) for scope 
value functions. Consider several examples of applications of these criteria. As an il­
lustration, consider another deviation from the standard model of consumer, namely, 
the model of consumption under privileges, in particular characterizing the life of high 
officials in the recent Soviet history. The standard of living of such a person depended 
mainly on his access to privileged goods and services, such as special stores, dining halls, 
hotels and so on; the prices etc. played a minor role. Tlie set X of privileges available 
depended on the person's position in the official hierarchy. If a person held several ap­
pointments, e.g. , if a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was 
also a member of the Supreme Council of the USSR, then both sets of perks, X' and X", 
might be united. However, since the privileges of the member of the Central Committee 
included more attractive perks than those of the member of the Supreme Council, he 
would not need to use the latter privileges. Hence the standard of living v(X' U X") 
determined by the union of both lists of privileges X' and X" was not larger than the 
ievel v(X') of the higher position: Therefore; the, nonemergence eondition N should be 
fulfilled for v. The fulfillment of the monotonicity condition M is even more so obvious. 
Since the U-completeness of the family U of lists of privileges here is naturally fulfilled, 
Theorem 15 guarantees the existence of the corresponding hierarchy of privileges x, mea­
sured according to some generating scale w(x), such that the person's standard of living 
v is primitive rational. This means that v(X) it is equal to the maximum level of the 
privileges x E X available to the person. Note that we have not considered explicitly 
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alternative modes of person's behavior, so this example is actually within the framework 
of the model of decisions with hidden alternatives. 
Formal examples. Now we shall consider more formal examples, which manifest the 
applicability of the above technique beyond the problem of estimation of "opportunity 
scopes" and even beyond the decision theory in the narrow sense. We shall confine 
ourselves to the simplest case when the reference ordered set L consists of just two 
elements, say L = {0, 1 }  (where naturally 0 < 1) .  Let lj , be a set ofsome experts, or 
voters, U be some set of groups X i;;; U of experts, and v(X) E L  be the group attitude 
(estimate) of some issue. Let two possible values, 0 and 1 ,  denote approval ( "yea" ) 
and disapproval ( "nay") respectively. Then the condition M means that enlarging the 
group can only enhance its negative, but not positive, attitude to the issue, or, more 
formally, it can switch the value v from 0 to 1 but not vice versa. The condition N 
means that if a group is decomposed into new smaller subgroups (with possible overlap) ,  
then the positive attitude (approval) by all subgroups implies the approval by the group 
as a whole. The condition MN means the same as M in the more general case, when 
new groups form an arbitrary covering (rather than decomposition) of the initial group; 
besides the initial participants, the new groups may include extra ones. 
To describe this situation formally, it is convenient to use logical notations, taking 
as v(X) a logical function l(X) with the values 0 ( "false" ) and 1 ( "true" ) .  The function 
l(X) represents the group decision from the "negative" standpoint, i.e. l(X) = 1 iff the 
group X disapproves the issue, and l(X) = 0 iff X approves it. Then the condition M 
says that 
if X i;;; X', then l(X) =? l(X'), 
the condition N says that 
if X = U X", then 
vEN 
V l(X") =? l(X),
vEN 
(72) 
(73) 
and the condition NM is obtained from (73) by replacing the sign = by i;;; . (All X's above 
are meant to belong to the admissible family U). Provided the corresponding conditions 
are fulfilled, the above primitive rationality criteria assert that the function I must be
separable, which in logical terms means the representability of I in the disjunctive form
l(X) = V a(x), (74) 
:z:EX 
where a : U ---t { 0, 1 }  is a logical function on the set of the experts. The function a( x) can 
be interpreted as the personal attitude of the expert x to the issue considered: a(x) = 0 
means the person's approval and a(x) = 1 - disapproval. Then (74) means that group X 
as a whole approves the issue (l(X) = 0) if and only if every member of the group does 
so. Consequently, each voter possesses "the right of veto" : his single "nay" is enough to 
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reject the issue. Since in the representation (74) the function a is fixed, we can explicitly 
list the subgroup A <;;:; U of experts with the negative attitude: 
A =  {x E U  I a(x) = 1 } .  (75) 
Then the resulted attitude of each group X E U can be also represented as 
l(X) = 1 ¢? X n A oJ 0, (76) 
that is, the group X rejects the issue if and only if it contains at least one expert with 
the negative attitude. 
To conclude, note that by Theorem 13 and Lemma 6 the function I, when primitive
rational, can be represented by means of the revealed attitude function 
a1(x) = /\ l(X). (77) 
X :xEXEU 
The function a1( x) describes the supposed attitude of the expert x, as if he votes in 
accordance with the prescribed attitude a1(x) and the group decision rule is the veto rule 
(74): the revealed attitude a1(x) assigned to the person x is "disapprove" if and only if 
each group that contains him rejects the issue, and "approve" if and only if at least one 
such group accepts the issue. Finally, if the family U is 1-complete, i.e., if every expert 
is questioned separately then we have the autoseparable representation (see (63)) of the 
group decision function I: 
l(X) = V l({x}) . (78) 
xEX 
Here the revealed attitude a1( x) of expert x is the expert's genuine attitude I( { x} ) .
Now we shall apply the above model of group decisions to examine two problems 
which, though seemingly different from the collective estimation problem , turn out to 
be of the same type. 
1. Group decision approach to individual choice.
Let us return to the conventional choice model described in Section 2,  and treat it 
from the group decision standpoint. Fix an option x E U and consider the fact of x 
being chosen or rejected as a result of the influence of the choice context: the latter 
in the framework of the abstract choice model is the presented alternative set X 3 x. 
Then all alternatives y E X play the role of experts "examining" the alternative x. At 
the same time nothing prevents x from examining alternatives y. This occurs explicitly 
in tournaments; to follow this suit, let us consider the choice problem as a kind of an 
implicit tournament between alternatives presented. Within the model of rational choice 
of the form ( 18) or (19) ,  the negative j udgement of the "expert" y on the subject x is 
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the strict preference yPx; in the form ( 16) or ( 17) ,  the positive judgement of y on x is 
the nonstrict preference xRy. 
In the general form, under fixed x E U, let ux = {X E  U I X  3 x}  be the family of 
feasible sets of experts evaluating x. We shall extract the group evaluation of x by the 
group X, observing the fact of choosing x from X (either in a single choice case or in a 
more general set-wise choice case). Let 
zx(x) = { o,
1 ,  
if x = c(X) 
otherwise. 
(or x E C'(X)), (79) 
It is easy to verify, that, in particular, the monotonicity condition M for l is equivalent to 
the heredity condition H for the choice model, the nonemergence condition N is equivalent 
to the concordance condition C, the synthetic condition NM is equivalent to CH, and 
ARV is equivalent to RA. For example, in the single-choice case, the condition M in the 
form (72) yields: if X, X' E ux and X C,::: X', then x = c(X') =? x = c(X), i .e. , we obtain 
the condition N (the extension onto the general set-wise choice is evident) .  
Thus, we have in  fact embedded the standard (individual) choice model, together 
with its properties considered in Section 2, into the above group decision model. As 
a consequence, some important propositions and theorems of Section 2 can be shown 
to be particular cases of the corresponding propositions and theorems of the present 
section: viz., Propositions 3 and 5, Theorems 1 ,2,4 and 5 have become corollaries from 
Propositions 10  and 12, Theorems 13,14,15 and 12, respectively. To show this in relation 
to the theorems, which are, respectively, the criteria of rationality for choice functions c 
in Section 2 and the criteria of primitive rationality for logical group decision functions zx 
(in the role of scope values v) in this section, we develop our construction. The primitive
rationality of zx means that there exists a function ax : U ->  {O, 1 } such that for every 
x E UX 
zx(x) = v ax(y). (80) 
yEX 
Consider the collection { zx}xEU of functions zx and introduce the binary relation R on U
by 
(81 ) 
Then it is easy to see that the rationalization in the form ( 16) for c takes place if and 
only if the separability in the form (80) for each zx, x E U, defined by (79) takes place, 
and in such a case the correspondence (81) is valid. Therefore, the notion of the primitive 
rationality for scope values turns out to be a generalization of the notion of the commonly 
used rationality for choice functions. 
2. Group decision approach to the problem of causal dependencies.
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We now outline the problem of causality in terms of a simple model in the spirit of 
J.S.Mill (see Malishevski, 1989) .  Consider an observable "output" event. Let 1 denote 
the occurrence and 0 the absence of this event. Consider also a set U of some primary 
"input" events x,  y ,  . . .  ; let a function l : U --> {O, 1 }  denote the logical dependence 
between the input and output events ,  where U <;;; 2u is a family of possible combinations
(sets) of input events that occur simultaneously. Namely, l(X) = 1 if and only if the 
output event is observed when input events x E X, but no event y E U\X, have occurred. 
We shall call the function I primitive causal, if there exists a subset A <;;; U called the set 
of primitive causes of the observed output event, such that: 
l(X) = 1 if and only if X contains at least one input event x E A. (82) 
Note that the requirement of primitive casualty (82) is exactly the condition (76). 
Thus, the primitive causality coincides with the separability, or the primitive rationality 
of the function I. Therefore, all the above criteria of primitive rationality can be used
for examining primitive causality. The detailed investigation of the model of cause­
effect relationships (with many output events as well as input events) can be found in 
Malishevski, 1989. 
Problems 1 and 2 have been reduced above to a kind of separability problem which 
was then resolved by means of axiomatic conditions. The key role among those is played 
by the pair of conditions, Monotonicity (or Heritage, in choice problems) ,  and Nonemer­
gence (or Concordance, respectively). It should be noted that Sen's system of axioms a 
and I was the first one which served as rationale for stating the corresponding kind of 
separability (rationality, or binariness) of choice functions. 
Returning to the general problem of opportunity scope values, consider in conclusion a 
wider formulation of the problem � one that does not require the fulfillment of primitive 
rationality criteria. Namely, consider the case when only one of the conditions M and N 
is fulfilled, yielding two types of "semirational" scope functions. 
Theorem 16 For an arbitrary U, a scope value v satisfies the condition M or, respec­
tively, the condition N, if and only if v can be represented in the following primitive 
semirational form: for any X E U 
v (X) = max w(x; X),xEX (83) 
with the generating value function (pseudoscale) w(x; X) on U x U monotonically in­
creasing, resp . ,  decreasing, in X on U (in the sense that X <;;; X' =? w(x; X) � (resp. 2 
) w( x;  X'), \x1ith x fixed and .. Y, .. Y' E ll). 
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Proof. Necessity. Define 
(84) 
(85) 
for any x E X E U.  (Extension of the definition (84), (85) to x rf_ X, if needed, can 
be done, e.g., by taking w-:(x, X) = maxyEu v(Y) and w+(x; X) = minveu v(Y)) .  It is
obvious that for any x E X E U 
(86) 
and that w-(resp.w+) is monotonically decreasing (resp. increasing) in X. Let us show 
that a scope value satisfying N (resp., M) is representable in the form (83) with the 
generating value function w- (resp., w+) .  First, let v satisfy N. Take a set yx,x yielding
min in the definition of w- (84), and collect the family {YX,x}xeX that is obviously a
decomposition of X. Therefore, by virtue of N, 
max w-(x; X) = max v(YX,x) 2: v(X).
xEX xEX
(87) 
Comparing (87) with (86) , we obtain for w- the equality needed. Now let v satisfy M.
Then obviously w+(x; X) = v(X), and so (83) with w = w+ trivially holds.
Sufficiency. Consider that w(x; X) in (83) is monotonic in X.  First, let w(x; X) be
monotonically decreasing in X. Take some X E  U and an arbitrary decomposition X of 
X in U. Then for v given by (83) 
V(X) = maxv(Y) = max max w(y, Y) 2: 
YEX YEX yEY • 
2: max max w(y; X) = max w(x; X) = v(X), (88) 
YEX yEY xEX 
which implies N. Finally, let w(x; X) be monotonically increasing in X.  Then, fulfilling 
M for v given by (83) is trivial. \l
Remark 8 It is easy to see that by using the logical technique developed and applied 
in this section for proving the statements of Section 2, one can also obtain Theorem 
1 1  (about semirational choice functions) as a corollary Theorem 16  (about primitive 
semirational scope values) .  
As  a comment for Theorem 16 ,  note that the monotonic increase of the generating 
value function w(x; X) in X reflects the increased importance of a fixed opportunity x 
when the whole opportunity scope X is enlarged. This implies a use of "combinations of 
opportunities" .  On the contrary, the decrease of w(x; X) in X means that the use of a 
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single opportunity x can be impeded by the presence of other opportunities. For example, 
the value of the opportunity x in the set X can have the form w(x ; X)  = u(x) - f(X), 
where f(X) is the expense increasing in X of realizing the opportunity x in the presence 
of other "distracting" opportunities y E X. 
5 . Further generalizations
We have examined the possibility of judging the rationality of a decision without 
explicit consideration of alternatives. The simplest model studied in Section 4 is only 
the first step in this direction. This model is still closely tied to the source of the 
idea of rationality, viz. ,  to the conventional choice model and the common notions of 
"alternatives" as points in the "space of possibilities" , of values (or relative preferences) 
of these alternatives etc. A further refusal of such notions leads to a further development 
of models of rational behavior without an explicit notion of alternatives. Here I will 
sketch and comment on some directions of possible generalizations. 
First, the model described in Section 4 demands too much. Indeed, we assumed the 
knowledge of (or an ability to observe or to obtain from the decision maker) the values
of different opportunity scopes. It is more natural ( and less restrictive ) to suppose 
that the analyst possesses only "milder" information concerning the relative worths of 
different scopes. For example, we observe, in reality or mentally, the qualitative results 
of pairwise comparisons of different scopes from DM's standpoint. Formally this yields a 
binary relation between the scopes, which in terms of the measurement theory presents 
a structure of experimental relations on the object field. Then the purpose of theoretical 
investigation is to elaborate a measurement scale with an appropriate formal operation 
on corresponding scale values. What has been done in Section 4 is an example of such 
kind of problem resolution: the measurement scale w(x) on U with the operation max 
has been introduced to represent the "experimental data" given in the form of pairs 
(X, v(X)), i.e., of the mapping U -+ L. It is easy to extend those results to the case 
when a weak order on U rather than an explicit primary scaling U -+ L is given. Some 
other generalizations that can be obtained along this route have not been discussed due 
to lack of space. 
A deeper, both technically and conceptually, is the direction of generalization con­
nected with the refusal· of ·"point-wise" representations of'DM's opportunities. Indeed, 
in the above model we have still kept the representation of an opportunity scope as a 
set of some elements. Those elements were not necessarily alternatives, or options them­
selves; in the case of primitive rationality they turned out to be a kind of substitutes of 
alternatives, with their own revealed values as the rationale for optimal decisions. Such 
a situation takes place, for example, when the opportunity set is a legislation in the form 
of a "bill of rights" . Then, the application of a set-theoretical operation, such as a union 
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of several legislations seems to be justified. However, in general, a simple combining of 
several legislations does not lead to an intelligent text. It may be possible, though, to 
speak about some "creative" union of different legislations. To formalize this case, one 
needs to use algebraic systems with union (join) operations and covering relations that 
are more general than the set-theoretical ones. Such generalization (in semilattice-type 
terms) can be carried out as well, but this would require a separate exposition. 
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